by David Chalmers (NYU)
Under what conditions does a creature matter morally? Do only conscious beings matter? If so, what sort of consciousness is required? The popular "sentientist" view holds that the capacity for positively and negatively valenced experiences, such as pleasure and suffering, is required for moral status. David Chalmers will investigate this matter using some thought experiments involving zombies, Vulcans, and trolley problems.
David Chalmers is University Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at New York University. He is the author of The Conscious Mind (1996), Constructing The World (2010), and Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy (2022). He cofounded the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness and the PhilPapers Foundation. He is known for formulating the hard problem of consciousness and for the idea of the extended mind.